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Abstract
Imagine you are casually browsing an online bookstore, looking for an interesting novel. Suppose the store predicts you will 
want to buy a particular novel: the one most chosen by people of your same age, gender, location, and occupational status. 
The store recommends the book, it appeals to you, and so you choose it. Central to this scenario is an automated prediction 
of what you desire. This article raises moral concerns about such predictions. More generally, this article examines the eth-
ics of artificial social cognition—the ethical dimensions of attribution of mental states to humans by artificial systems. The 
focus is presumptuous aim attributions, which are defined here as aim attributions based crucially on the premise that the 
person in question will have aims like superficially similar people. Several everyday examples demonstrate that this sort of 
presumptuousness is already a familiar moral concern. The scope of this moral concern is extended by new technologies. 
In particular, recommender systems based on collaborative filtering are now commonly used to automatically recommend 
products and information to humans. Examination of these systems demonstrates that they naturally attribute aims pre-
sumptuously. This article presents two reservations about the widespread adoption of such systems. First, the severity of our 
antecedent moral concern about presumptuousness increases when aim attribution processes are automated and accelerated. 
Second, a foreseeable consequence of reliance on these systems is an unwarranted inducement of interpersonal conformity.
Keywords Aim attribution · Social cognition · Artificial intelligence · Presumptuousness · Recommendation · 
Recommender system · Collaborative filtering · Individuality · Conformity · Ethics
Introduction: an ethical issue for artificial 
social cognition
How our aims sharpen, how they evolve from general to 
more specific, can be morally significant. According to an 
influential individualistic ethos, all else equal, it is better 
for a person’s aims to develop according to her individual 
peculiarities than to be guided to conform with common 
patterns (Mill 1859/2003). A core contention of this article 
is that it matters not just how a person’s aims develop, but 
also how we predict and attribute aims to a person. Basing 
predictions and attributions on the premise that this person 
will follow the path of people she resembles can be objec-
tionably presumptuous.
As we will observe, presumptuousness is a familiar and 
relatively minor issue in ordinary social contexts. However, 
this article will demonstrate that new technologies extend 
the scope and moral significance of presumptuous aim 
attribution. This is so, in particular, with artificial recom-
mender systems, which automatically infer and attribute 
aims to humans. Many of these systems are based on tech-
niques known as collaborative filtering, which, by design, 
predict a person’s preferences, desires, and aims, based on 
her similarities with others. In relying on the assumption 
that individuals will conform to common interpersonal pat-
terns, these systems are inherently presumptuous. This raises 
two moral concerns about these systems. First, a foreseeable 
consequence of reliance on such systems is an unwarranted, 
yet self-perpetuating, inducement of conformity. Second, not 
only do these systems constitute a technological realization 
of an extant moral concern; they exacerbate it by acceler-
ating it and making it more widespread, beyond everyday 
contexts governed by familiar social norms.
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To raise moral concerns is not to conclude that the 
object of concern is undesirable overall. Even if I am cor-
rect in claiming that the recommender systems in ques-
tion have morally problematic features, it is undeniable 
that they also answer very real human needs. For instance, 
they may benefit us by helping us navigate the bewilder-
ingly wide arrays of diverse options among which we com-
monly must choose (Iyengar and Lepper 2000). Assessing 
whether and when the benefits of such systems outweigh 
the drawbacks requires articulation of suitable evaluative 
concepts. To this end, this article gives an account of pre-
sumptuousness, situating it in relation to the themes of 
individuality and conformity, and demonstrates the appli-
cability of this evaluative concept to a class of increasingly 
common automated systems.
Before laying out the relevant themes and arguments, let 
us situate this discussion in relation to the fields it touches: 
psychology, ethics, and computing. When psychologists 
speak of social cognition, they refer to the processes by 
which we humans come to understand one another and 
ourselves (Fiske and Taylor 2016). Central questions about 
social cognition are about how we recognize or infer what 
others are thinking. Hence, social cognition includes 
prediction and attribution of aims. Psychologists are, of 
course, primarily concerned with how social cognition 
actually works in humans. However, we can also con-
sider how it should work, in light of moral reasons for and 
against various possible social cognitive processes. This 
is a distinction between the psychology of social cogni-
tion and the ethics of social cognition. This distinction is 
already evident in discussions of stereotypes: Psycholo-
gists study how stereotypes work (e.g., Hamilton et al. 
1994), and ethicists assess the moral status of stereotyping 
(e.g., Blum 2004). The present article examines the moral 
status of the social cognitive processes of aim attribution. 
Since we will be especially concerned with how artificial 
systems perform aim attribution, our topic falls within the 
ethics of artificial social cognition.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section 
describes an example to bring the relevant range of moral 
questions into view. To sharpen the ensuing discussion, 
the two subsequent sections define and elaborate two cat-
egories of aim attribution: over-specific aim attribution 
and presumptuous aim attribution. The following sec-
tion invokes these categories to critique an increasingly 
prominent class of information technology. That section 
includes a high-level introduction to recommender systems 
and collaborative filtering, as well as an argument that 
such systems involve a mechanism well-suited to induce 
interpersonal conformity. The final section offers a broader 
assessment of the moral significance of presumptuous aim 
attribution, demonstrating why we should be concerned 
about its proliferation through automation.
Recognizing a moral dimension of aim 
attribution
Our lives unfold and take shape as our general aims evolve 
to become more specific. How, and in response to what 
pressures, this evolution occurs sometimes matters to us. 
To focus our attention on several morally salient features 
of this process, we begin with an example.
Imagine Celina who will soon begin her first year of 
university study. Celina would like a part-time job while 
she is a student, and she applies for a program that matches 
students with flexible jobs at her university. Her applica-
tion is accepted, and so she will be placed in one of three 
available roles: (1) selling university branded merchandise 
(like t-shirts, hats, mugs, etc.) at university events, (2) 
monitoring parking lots to allow only permitted vehicles, 
and (3) assisting with clerical tasks in the Philosophy 
Department. Suppose that Celina will end up taking the 
first position, selling university merchandise. Consider 
three alternative ways this might come about.
First, imagine Celina receives a letter from the pro-
gram administrator describing the three jobs and offering 
a choice among them. So, Celina consults several close 
friends who report enjoying the sales job. She also recog-
nizes that this position will allow her to visit a variety of 
university events, which seems both prudent and exciting. 
In contrast, monitoring parking lots seems dull and monot-
onous. Also, she has heard that philosophers are insuffer-
able. Upon reflection, she develops a desire to work in the 
sales position, and she responds to the letter accordingly.
Second, suppose Celina is traveling with friends when 
the letter arrives to her parents’ home. Her parents notice 
the envelope is marked as containing time-sensitive infor-
mation. Since Celina is far away and her parents are unable 
to contact her, they decide to open the letter and act on 
it. However, they do not know if Celina had one particu-
lar job in mind. Wondering which position Celina would 
want, they consider a few factors. For one thing, they know 
Celina thrives with exposure to new things (like she might 
encounter at events where she would sell merchandise). 
They also know Celina has often felt uncomfortable when 
called upon to be assertive, and they have noticed that 
many parking monitors are rather gruff. Finally, they have 
heard that philosophers are insufferable. So, they conclude 
that Celina would pick the sales job, and they respond 
accordingly on her behalf.
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Third, suppose the administrator of the student employ-
ment program decides to streamline the placement process 
by matching applicants to positions himself (without send-
ing out letters). For Celina, he immediately rules out the 
parking position because he believes that most women are 
insufficiently assertive. Looking at the photo in Celina’s 
profile, he perceives Celina as cheerful and attractive. As 
a cheerful person, she might be able to deal well enough 
with the insufferable philosophers. However, he feels sure 
that this cheerful, attractive young woman will enjoy the 
attention from attendees of university events. So he con-
cludes that Celina would want the sales position.
Celina had to undergo some change of mind, from the 
general aim of taking a student job, to a specific intention 
to take one of the particular positions. Although the out-
come of the process was the same in the three alternative 
scenarios,1 the scenarios do not seem to be morally on a 
par. The first two scenarios seem fairly unobjectionable. The 
first manifests a deliberate exercise of agency, with Celina 
responsive to relevant facts about herself and her situation. 
In the second, Celina’s parents made the same determina-
tion that Celina would have made, and did so in ways that 
reflected their understanding of her as an individual, taking 
into account some of the same facts about her personality 
that would have been the basis for her own determination. 
Hence, especially since Celina could not have responded 
herself, there seems little cause for complaint regarding the 
second scenario.
In contrast, the third scenario is likely to raise qualms. 
Like the second scenario, the third is one that called for 
deciding on Celina’s behalf, and the eventual decision was 
the same. However, unlike Celina’s parents who drew on 
knowledge specifically about Celina, the administrator rea-
soned according to some dubious generalizations about 
gender. Furthermore, even putting aside whether the gen-
eralizations were accurate, we may worry about whether a 
generalization like that was appropriate for the case at hand. 
An interpersonal generalization based on Celina’s superficial 
characteristics figured crucially in a decision that seemed to 
call for sensitivity to individual differences. Such a generali-
zation exhibits what I will call presumptuousness, as I will 
elaborate momentarily.
At any rate, none of the three scenarios seems particu-
larly unusual or unfamiliar. Moreover, even if I am correct 
in suggesting something is morally amiss with the third 
scenario, there may seem little cause for concern. After 
all, the administrator ended up making the right decision. 
No harm, no foul, we might think. To protest an acceptable 
answer wrongly reached may seem fussy and overly fastidi-
ous. However, withholding protest is risky. If it were increas-
ingly common for our aims to take shape as in the third 
scenario, then we should worry about this ipso facto loss 
of individual agency and the diminished authorship of our 
own lives. Shortly, I will argue that just such a worry is war-
ranted regarding automated classification systems applied to 
us and our aims. Before that, we must look more carefully at 
the specificity of our aims, the accuracy of aim attributions, 
and the kinds of evidence on which such attributions may 
be grounded.
The specificity of our aims and aim 
attributions
Consider how our general aims may sharpen and become 
more specific. Imagine I am browsing the news on a sum-
mer Saturday morning. The sun shines, and a warm breeze 
gently rustles my curtains. As I finish a cup of coffee, I get 
restless, and I am becoming inclined to be active outdoors. 
A friend sends a message asking, “Want to go water skiing 
this afternoon?” to which I immediately reply, “Yes, I do!” I 
have never been water skiing before, and I start anticipating 
what it will be like. As I read about it and watch a video, I 
get excited. My friend says she will be in touch again shortly, 
and so I return to reading the news. In a half hour, I get 
another message from the same friend: “Hey, want to go 
for a hike?” Now surprised and a little concerned, I reply, 
“Wait, what about water skiing?” She says, “Well, I just went 
skiing last weekend. And I know you like hiking.” A little 
disappointed, I reply, “I mean, I guess I could go for a hike.”
In this scenario, my aims evolved from very general and 
open-ended to much more specific—specific enough, in 
fact, to preempt other specific aims that would have satisfied 
my original general aim. Before my friend’s first message, 
motivated by restlessness, I had a very general aim of some 
activity in the sun and the breeze. If she had first asked if I 
wanted to hike, my reply would have been just like my reac-
tion to water skiing: “Yes, I do!” But, as it happened, she 
first suggested skiing, and I soon wanted to do precisely that.
This mundane example exhibits two facts that will be 
essential in what follows: one fact about a kind of diver-
sity in our aims, and one fact about the mutability of our 
aims. First, our aims are diverse with regard to their levels 
of specificity. In other words, there is a difference between 
our general dispositions for pursuit and our well-articulated 
objectives. We can think of these mental states on a con-
tinuum from the very general to the very specific. At one 
end, our aims barely deserve that label; they are more like 
1 Since the story is fictional, we can stipulate that there are no last-
ing differences among the scenarios. For example, we can assume 
that any extra feeling of agency that Celina might have experienced 
in the first scenario, from having made the selection herself, quickly 
becomes negligible.
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dispositions to respond favorably to particular sorts of rep-
resentations and unfavorably to others. Our general, unar-
ticulated aims are among the sorts of mental states that are 
most likely shared by some non-human animals. My old 
dog Petey was disposed to pursue a vaguely defined set of 
objects, including familiar subcategories, like rabbits and 
people food, as well as untold objects he never encountered 
or imagined. Such dispositions to pursue open-ended classes 
of objects—broad inclinations, we might consider them—
are aims of the most general sort. At the other end of the 
continuum, we have highly refined, conceptually complex 
aims. Petey, loving though he was, never had a desire that 
I recoup my disastrous financial loss and regain my self-
esteem before traveling home for a reunion with old friends. 
Dogs simply do not have the mental resources to formulate 
aims so specific.
Despite the diversity of aims, the category is united by 
a common characteristic: Aims are dispositions for pursuit. 
They are mental states that motivate interaction with the 
world, to change it in a particular direction. That is, they are 
mental states the world is brought to fit, in contrast to states 
like belief which should come to fit the world (Anscombe 
1957). It is this unifying feature of aims that make them 
relevant to the practical topic of this paper. Aims encompass 
the full class of mental states that motivate the pursuit or 
acceptance of an option that has been suggested or offered, 
whether the suggestion comes from a friend or an automated 
system.
This understanding of aims shares much with the account 
of desires offered by Smith (1994). However, aims are a 
more appropriate focus than desires. Although any desire 
counts as an aim, aims are not necessarily desires, since 
desire is essentially connected to the reward system and 
pleasure (Schroeder 2004). For present purposes, we need 
not require that aims bear such connections, and we thus 
allow the possibility that a person could be guided by an aim 
that would not, strictly speaking, count as a desire.
Thus conceived, aims are similar to the construct of goals 
in psychology, particularly as in the goal-setting theory of 
motivation (Locke and Latham 1990). However, the goal-
setting literature tends to focus on action and accomplish-
ment of goals (Locke and Latham 2013), whereas aims, as 
understood here, also include more passive, dispositional 
preferences. Moreover, though consistent with goal-setting 
theory, the conception of aims here does not endorse or rely 
on the particular commitments of goal-setting theory, or 
its unitary concept of motivation (Deci 1992). In short, the 
general conception of aims adopted here is intended to be 
ecumenical.
The second essential fact about our aims is that they are 
dynamic, with general, open-ended aims evolving into, or 
being replaced by, more specific aims. We often aim at some 
general end, and, in the course of reflecting on it and pursu-
ing it, come to aim at some more specific end that constitutes 
one way that the general end might be realized.2 Indeed, 
this is arguably one of the main operations of our practical 
reasoning (Richardson 1997; Bratman 1989). But, besides 
orderly reasoning, this process of increasing aim specificity 
can happen more haphazardly as well. As in the example 
above, a friend might suggest a Saturday activity. Or I might 
see an advertisement as I browse the news. Or I might simply 
find myself in a setting where I am expected to behave in 
some way which, though indeed one among many possible 
refinements of a general aim, is more specific than I had yet 
imagined: “Oh, I guess we’re heading to the dance floor. 
Okay, cool.”
With the class of aims thus circumscribed, we can con-
sider the attribution of aims. I will understand attribution 
broadly, such that judging that a person has a particular aim, 
stating that she has that aim, drawing inferences from the 
premise that she has that aim, and treating the person as 
though she has that aim, would each count as attributing the 
aim. And now we can consider how attributions may suc-
ceed or fail to accurately reflect the specificity of the aims 
a person has.
Let E, F, and G be propositions such that E entails G, 
and F entails G, and E and F are mutually inconsistent. We 
can think of G as the content of a general aim and E and F 
as two incompatible ways of making G more specific. For a 
concrete interpretation along the lines of our first example, 
think of G as I engage in outdoor recreation, E as I go water 
skiing, and F as I go for a hike. Thus, if a person aims that 
G, and it happens that either E or F comes to be, then that 
aim is ipso facto satisfied. It is possible for a person with the 
Fig. 1  G is the content of a general aim. E and F are, respectively, the 
contents of two mutually exclusive aims that are ways of making the 
general aim of G more specific. Realizing either E or F would suffice 
for the realization of G
2 Of course, the reverse is always possible. A specific aim, e.g., write 
a coming-of-age novel, can evolve to something more general, e.g., do 
some creative writing. Though such specific-to-general transforma-
tions are interesting, too, they will not be in focus here.
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general aim that G to aim for the disjunction of E and F, but 
not for their conjunction (Fig. 1).
We can distinguish three different kinds of inaccuracy 
in the attribution of aims. First, suppose that a person aims 
that E, but we attribute to her the aim that F. Then we have 
simply attributed the wrong aim to her. So, if it becomes true 
that F, then her aim will have been thwarted. Call this class 
of inaccuracy simple inaccuracy.
Next, suppose that the person aims that G, and we attrib-
ute the aim that F. In that case we have again attributed the 
wrong aim, but the mistake is much less severe from a prac-
tical perspective. That is because if it becomes true that F, 
then her aim will have been satisfied, not thwarted at all. So, 
we must distinguish this class of inaccuracy from the first; 
we can say that such attributions are inaccurate because 
over-specific. These attributions are inaccurate precisely in 
the sense that they represent the class of desired outcomes as 
narrower than the class that would actually satisfy the aim.
Finally, suppose that the person aims that F and we attrib-
ute to her an aim that G. In one respect, this is not inaccurate 
at all, since if she aims at F, she cannot deny that she aims 
at G (assuming the entailment of G by F is transparent). 
However, attributing an aim that G without also attributing 
a specific aim that F would mistake the content of her aim. 
Furthermore, such inaccuracy is of practical import since 
it may become true that G without it becoming true that F. 
Indeed, if it becomes true that G because E is true, the per-
son’s aim would be thwarted. We can say that our attribution 
in this case was inaccurate because under-specific.
Our primary focus here will be inaccuracy due to over-
specificity. This type of inaccuracy will be especially sig-
nificant for two reasons. First, this is a form of inaccuracy 
that may easily go unnoticed, because people tend to accept 
over-specific aim attributions. Second, over-specific attribu-
tions, despite their inaccuracy, influence and direct behavior.
Our earlier example shows how people tend to accept 
over-specific aim attributions. Suppose, as in the example, 
by mid-morning I had merely the general aim of doing 
something fun outside. If I am then offered the chance to 
go water skiing, I will accept. Moreover, if I am treated 
as though I have the specific aim of going water skiing, I 
will not protest or try to spur any course correction. Now, 
generalizing from this example, if a person has a general 
aim that G, the person is attributed an aim that F (where F 
clearly satisfies G), and the person has no other aims that 
are inconsistent with F, then the person will acquiesce to the 
attribution of aiming at F and will not protest being treated 
as aiming at F. Furthermore, if she has an offer of F, which 
she can accept or decline, she will accept. Crucially, with 
over-specific aim attributions, such acceptance would not 
signify full accuracy.
We tend to accept and adopt over-specific aim attribu-
tions out of practicality. In fact, adopting an aim that is 
more specific than what we had in mind is part of our most 
basic process for satisfying our goals (Richardson 1997). 
A general aim may be too general to be satisfied at that 
level of generality. For example, if I want a writing utensil 
to scribble down a number, then a pencil, a pen, a crayon, 
a chalk stick, or a marker would be fine. But the object that 
actually satisfies my aim will be one of these specific types, 
not somehow a non-committal disjunction of them. In other 
words, I cannot have a general writing utensil per se, rather 
only a writing utensil of some more specific type. Hence, 
if I were offered a pencil I would accept. Thus, in ordinary 
cases, people accept the attribution of over-specific aims 
simply because acquisition or realization of the objects of 
the aims attributed signifies practical success, not failure.3
Now we can highlight the crucial epistemic consequence 
of the tendency to acquiesce to the attribution of an over-
specific aim. Consider an ongoing process in which each 
episode culminates with the attribution of an aim to a per-
son and with the attributer recording the person’s response. 
Suppose that records of those responses will be evidence 
guiding future aim attributions to this person or others. Since 
an over-specific attribution will not be protested and indeed 
may be embraced, it follows that there will be no trace of the 
inaccuracy constituted by the over-specificity. So, without 
some deliberate ingenuity to catch the subtle difference, this 
inaccuracy will register as accuracy. Thus, we can say that 
over-specific aim attributions prompt no error signal.
The second reason inaccuracy due to over-specificity is 
important regards its practical consequences. Not only are 
over-specific attributions accepted without prompting an 
error signal; once accepted, they go on to influence behav-
ior. One reason is simply that aims, once adopted, tend to be 
stable, and this is a core feature of the operation of practi-
cal rationality. As Michael Bratman says of prior intentions 
and plans: “their retention and non-reconsideration should 
be treated as the default, but a default that is overridable 
by certain special kinds of contingencies” (1989, p. 449). 
Bratman (1992, 2010) argues that such stability is rational 
for at least three reasons. First, when we have intentions, we 
tend to act on those intentions, which changes the world in 
ways that support the continuation of those very intentions. 
Second, due to limitations of time and mental resources, 
reconsideration of our intentions is costly. Third, and closely 
related, habits that limit our tendencies to reconsider our 
3 Although commonsense, this claim is difficult to verify empirically. 
That is because, given that the claim is true, it entails that what offers 
an experimental subject would accept would not reveal the specificity 
of her aims. Introspection about how we make choices may well be 
our best source of evidence for this claim.
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intentions fit well within a larger system of planning agency 
that increases our effectiveness.
Another reason acceptance of over-specific aim attribu-
tions is likely to influence behavior is that specific aims are 
especially stable. The psychology of implementation inten-
tions shows that specific aims, especially an aim at a spe-
cific means to an already established end, tend to be stable 
(Gollwitzer 1999; Gollwitzer and Schaal 1998).4 Moreover, 
studies in goal-setting and motivation have shown that the 
specificity of a goal increases commitment to it (Wright and 
Kacmar 1994; Klein et al. 1999).
We are now in a position to see that over-specific aim 
attributions may constitute self-fulfilling prophecies. If it is 
indeed true both that people tend to accept over-specific aim 
attributions and that these aims tend to be stable, then attrib-
uting an over-specific aim will tend to bring it about that the 
person has that very aim. Thus, over-specific attribution of 
aims is a powerful means of subtly influencing a person. It is 
a subtle sort of influence because it is gentle—aligning with 
and guiding, rather than redirecting, a person’s aims.5 Due to 
this gentleness, it is unlikely to be opposed or even noticed. 
So, not only is there no error signal at the moment of attribu-
tion, the ensuing change is also unlikely to arouse protest.
Presumptuousness and the evidence for aim 
attributions
To assess the accuracy of an aim attribution is not yet to 
say anything at all about the evidential basis for the attribu-
tion. Our second main distinction regarding the attribution of 
aims is about evidence and justification for the attributions. 
With what sort of evidence might a system (whether human 
or artificial) attribute an aim to a person?
Three categories of justification will be relevant to our 
purposes here. The first possibility, of course, is that an 
attribution has no justification or little justification at all. 
Perhaps it is simply a guess, or, more likely, the aim was 
imputed purely according to the interests of the attributer 
independently of whether the person in question actually had 
that aim. Obviously, this way of attributing aims is not reli-
ably accurate. Furthermore, some evidence of the very broad 
statistical sort—like the general observation that people tend 
to prefer outdoor recreation on sunny days more than on 
rainy days—is usually easy to come by. So, since there is 
usually value in increased reliability, aim attributions with 
no justification are bound to be rare.
Among the attributions that have substantial evidential 
support, we can identify two rough categories. On one hand, 
we have those attributions for which the justification is pri-
marily statistical. These are based on generalizations about 
a population applied to the particular person in question. On 
the other hand, we have attributions that are individually sen-
sitive. These attributions are based on facts about the par-
ticular individual in question and what aims it makes sense 
for her to have. Granted, there is no sharp boundary between 
these two categories. Furthermore, since many attributions 
are made on the basis of several pieces of evidence, there 
is no single continuum between the statistically based and 
the individually sensitive attributions. Nonetheless, we can 
recognize that some attributions clearly fall more neatly in 
one category than in the other. For example, think back to 
the scenarios about Celina’s job placement. The attribution 
by the program administrator was based on general assump-
tions linking gender to interests and occupational aims. In 
contrast, Celina’s parents drew their conclusion based largely 
on their knowledge of Celina and her individual tendencies, 
not through generalizations about a class of superficially simi-
lar people. Crucially, this is not to imply that Celina’s par-
ents’ evidence was completely dispositive, or even that it was 
probabilistically stronger than the administrator’s evidence. 
Rather, the point is to draw a distinction regarding the content 
of the evidence in relation to the subject of the aim attribution.
To adopt some terminology with more pronounced nor-
mative connotations, we can say this: To the extent that an 
aim attribution was justified statistically, in that its basis 
was primarily an interpersonal generalization, as opposed 
to evidence particularly about the person as an individual, 
the attribution was presumptuous. It is presumptuous in that 
it depends crucially on the presupposition that the person 
in question will have aims like those of people to whom 
she bears some other similarity.6 In invoking the concept 
of presumptuousness with its negative connotations, I am 
definitely not diminishing the epistemological credentials of 
the crucial presupposition or the inferences drawn from it. 
After all, the presupposition is an instance of the assumption 
on which all inductive inference depends, and interpersonal 
inductive inferences about persons’ aims are indeed credible. 
6 Presumptuousness has been characterized this way by King (2019), 
in the context of ethical issues in the development of computerized 
image recognition systems.
5 Should we consider this as an infringement of the person’s auton-
omy? It is difficult to say a little bit about autonomy without saying a 
lot. For now, two observations must suffice. First, because it is influ-
ence that aligns with a person’s extant aims, a self-fulfilling over-spe-
cific aim attribution usurps only marginally a person’s authority over 
what aims to have. Second, because a self-fulfilling over-specific aim 
attribution may sharpen an aim prematurely (or at least earlier than 
the person otherwise would have), it reduces the person’s ability to 
plan her life at her own pace.
4 This sort of stability prevents one specific aim from being replaced 
by an aim at an alternative means of achieving the same general end. 
However, such specific aims do not necessarily persist independent of 
the existence and strength of the general aim from which they devel-
oped (Gollwitzer and Schaal 1998; Sheeran et al. 2005).
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However, ethical status is not the same as epistemological 
status; the ethics of social cognition is not reducible to the 
accuracy of social cognition. Several of the ethical issues 
about presumptuous aim attributions will emerge shortly. 
For now, the goal is to further clarify the distinction between 
those attributions that are presumptuous and those that are 
not.
Consider an aim attribution: Subject S aims at A. This 
attribution is presumptuous if and only if the primary evi-
dence for the attribution consists of these two pieces of 
information: (1) S has characteristic C. (2) Most people 
with C aim at A. For a more concrete example, consider 
Sara. Sara is an American woman. She is between 25 and 
30 years old. Her annual income is in the third quartile of 
American women in her age bracket. In the last 2 days, she 
has purchased a swimsuit, a towel, sunglasses, and a chlo-
rine-removing shampoo. Suppose we have data about several 
thousand people who, like Sara, have the characteristics just 
listed. And suppose that a vast majority of those people aim 
to visit an outdoor swimming pool in the next 2 weeks. If, on 
the basis of all and only this evidence, we attribute to Sara 
the aim of visiting an outdoor swimming pool in the next 
2 weeks, then our aim attribution is presumptuous. That is 
because nothing about the content of Sara’s features played 
a role in the inference, but her similarity to other people did. 
The inference has the same logical form as this one: Sara 
has characteristics #1–#8. A vast majority of people with 
characteristics #1–#8 have aim A. Therefore, we can con-
clude that Sara has aim A. As such, the inference is driven 
by nothing other than the premise that a particular person 
will fit the predominant profile of characteristics and aims.
If that commonplace and straightforward inference about 
Sara was presumptuous, one might wonder, what is the alter-
native? What would not be a presumptuous aim attribution? 
Well, the very same aim could be attributed to Sara by think-
ing differently about some of the same information about 
her. If the information were used, not just to find a pattern 
she fits, but also to make sense of her, then the ensuing aim 
attribution would not be so presumptuous. We might reason 
as follows: First, we know that she bought a swimsuit. Then 
we can draw on our background knowledge that swimsuits 
are designed for swimming. So, maybe Sara is planning to 
go swimming. Also, towels are useful for drying oneself 
after swimming. Since she has bought sunglasses, which 
are effective for protecting eyes from the sun, we might also 
think she is planning to be outside. The aim of going to an 
outdoor swimming pool, the beach, or some other body of 
water would explain these bits of information about Sara. 
But only the aim of going to a chlorinated swimming pool 
would also explain why she chose that particular shampoo. 
Hence, we attribute to her the aim of going to an outdoor 
swimming pool.
This non-presumptuous reasoning was guided by the goal 
of making sense of Sara, by unifying what we know about 
her into a coherent portrait of her as an agent. It is true that 
the reasoning relied on some of the same associations—
e.g., between swimsuits and swimming—that might figure in 
presumptuous reasoning. However, this instance of non-pre-
sumptuous reasoning considers these associations in terms 
of Sara’s possible means and ends, instead of as content-
neutral, interpersonal, statistical regularities. In short, this 
inference was not presumptuous precisely because it did not 
rely on a premise about what most people resembling Sara 
aim to do.7
At this point, some may object: Wait, how do you know 
that the tap water in her area is not heavily chlorinated? How 
do you know that she is not planning to wear that swimsuit 
in her bathtub? How do you know that the sunglasses are 
not for driving? Or maybe the sunglasses are a gift? My 
response to these questions is, of course, that I do not know. 
These questions suggest alternative hypotheses about Sara’s 
aims, and nothing I have said rules them out. Furthermore, 
if we were wagering money on what Sara will do, it may 
very well be that the presumptuous basis for attributing aims 
would give us more confidence than does the non-presump-
tuous reasoning just described. To call an aim attribution 
presumptuous or non-presumptuous is not to assess the 
strength of the evidence for it, but rather to characterize the 
assumptions invoked.
There may be a variety of bases for attributing aims non-
presumptuously. The example of Sara points us to one par-
ticularly notable mode of non-presumptuous aim attribution, 
related to the interpretationist (or interpretivist) theories of 
mind developed by Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett 
(Davidson 1985, 2001; Dennett 1987). According to these 
theories, correct attributions of aims, beliefs, and other men-
tal states to a person depend on application of an explanatory 
schema—what Dennett calls the intentional stance—which 
involves attributing mental states to a person as a way of 
making sense of her history of speech and action and pre-
dicting her behavior.8 Here is how Dennett describes the 
intentional stance: “[O]ne treats the system whose behavior 
is to be predicted as a rational agent; one attributes to the 
7 It is one thing to describe non-presumptuous reasoning on which an 
aim attribution might be based. It would be quite another to automate 
it. It may turn out that, for some applications, non-presumptuous rea-
soning is difficult to implement algorithmically. For now, what mat-
ters is just to see how the two modes of reasoning differ.
8 These theories actually make the stronger claim that the mental 
states themselves are, in some sense, interpretation-dependent. I.e., 
what it is for a person to have these mental states is for her to be such 
that these are the mental states posited by the most predictive and 
charitable interpretation of her from the intentional stance (Dennett 
1987, 1991; Davidson 2001). For purposes of this article, this strong 
claim is not required.
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system the beliefs and desires it ought to have, given its 
place in the world and its purpose, and then predicts that it 
will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs” (Dennett 
1988, p. 496). Attributions of aims according to the inten-
tional stance are not presumptuous. That is because such 
attributions are not simply projections of patterns observed 
in other persons.9
The intentional stance, which is our ordinary orientation 
to people, is different from our orientation to other objects in 
the natural world, and sharply contrasts with what Dennett 
calls the physical stance: “[O]ne predicts the behavior of a 
physical system (of stars, tides, volcanoes, DNA molecules) 
by exploiting information about the physical constitution of 
the system, and the laws of physics” (Dennett 1988, p. 496). 
The physical stance is the approach of the natural scientist 
trying to model and predict the natural world. In contrast to 
both the intentional stance and the physical stance, presump-
tuous attributions of aims depend on what we might coin 
the statistical stance. Along the lines of Dennett’s descrip-
tions just quoted, we might describe the statistical stance: 
One treats the system whose behavior is to be predicted as 
a collection of features, and predicts the values of unknown 
features by generalizing from similar patterns of features 
in other systems. The statistical stance can, in principle, be 
applied to any sort of system, which is no surprise, in light 
of the broad applicability of statistics and data analytics. 
When the “systems” in question are persons and the fea-
tures to be predicted are the mental states of those persons, 
then the statistical stance can be employed to make the sort 
of predictions we would otherwise get from the intentional 
stance.10 In these cases, since mental states are attributed 
according to interpersonal generalizations, the attributions 
are presumptuous. In the above example of Sara, the aim 
of going to an outdoor swimming pool was attributed, first 
presumptuously, according to the statistical stance, and then 
non-presumptuously, according to the intentional stance.
In the next two sections, we will see why it is some-
times morally problematic to employ the statistical stance 
for social cognition. For now, though, we would be remiss 
not to recognize the many occasions when it is valuable to 
apply the statistical stance to humans. Many areas of medi-
cal research, particularly clinical trials, exemplify fruitful 
and unproblematic application of the statistical stance to 
humans. Such research depends on the premise that indi-
viduals who have certain physiological similarities will have 
other physiological similarities, and the ensuing inferences 
become the basis for programs of diagnosis, prognosis, and 
treatment. Although researchers must always negotiate the 
risks of over-generalization, there is not a problem with gen-
eralization per se. The problems with presumptuousness, 
which are problems with generalization per se, arise pre-
cisely when the statistical stance is applied to individuals to 
infer the contents of their aims or other thoughts.
Automated aim attribution and inducement 
of conformity
Earlier, we examined what it means for an aim attribution 
to be inaccurate due to over-specificity. Now we have just 
considered what types of evidence might be the basis for aim 
attributions, to distinguish between presumptuous and non-
presumptuous attributions. In these discussions, we focused 
on ordinary, everyday cases of interpersonal attributions of 
aims. But social cognition is not just the purview of humans 
anymore. Any system capable of attributing mental states 
and predicting behavior to other systems engages in a variety 
of social cognition as well. In this section, we will extend 
the preceding discussions of aim attribution to automated 
systems that attribute aims, culminating with the suggestion 
that systems that combine over-specificity and presumptu-
ousness give rise to conformity.
The automated systems in focus are modern recommender 
systems based on collaborative filtering. Recommender 
systems are simply automated systems which provide users 
with recommendations of products, services, or other items 
(Melville and Sindhwani 2010). Of course, there are many 
possible goals with which one might design a recommender 
system, and some of these possible goals may not align with 
the interests of the user who receives the recommendations. 
For instance, a system may be designed to maximize profit 
by recommending the products with the highest profit mar-
gin. But, for purposes here, we will focus on the recom-
mendation problem as ordinarily formulated, which is the 
computational challenge of predicting how a user will rate 
(either by explicit assessment or by choice behavior) items 
that she has not yet rated (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin 2005). 
In other words, we will assume the recommender system is 
9 Of course, as both Dennett (1987) and Davidson (1985) recognize, 
the process of interpretation has to begin somewhere. And if there is 
nothing else to go on, we may have to begin by positing some basic 
beliefs and aims. These will be beliefs about truths and aims to bring 
about what is valuable (Davidson 2004). In exactly the same way, 
presumptuous attributions of aims may be required when we have 
nothing else to go on but still must, for whatever reason, attribute an 
aim to a person.
10 It is worth emphasizing that, just being geared toward the attri-
bution of aims, desires, beliefs, etc., does not make some method or 
theoretical orientation count as the intentional stance. Differences 
among the physical stance, the intentional stance, the design stance 
(Dennett 1987), and the statistical stance do not pertain to the deliver-
ances of each respective method. Rather the differences are in how 
the conclusions were reached and on what basis. Hence, the statistical 
stance does not become a special case of the intentional stance just in 
virtue of being applied to the attribution of aims.
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intended to provide the user with recommendations which 
match, as closely as possible, her actual aims.
Recommender systems come in two main varieties. Con-
tent-based recommender systems make recommendations 
based on a particular person’s own past behavior and the 
extent to which new items are similar to those for which the 
person has already expressed a preference. In contrast, col-
laborative filtering systems make recommendations accord-
ing to how other people have assessed the items available 
for recommendation. In practice, these approaches may be 
combined (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin 2005; Melville and 
Sindhwani 2010). However, at an abstract level, this distinc-
tion between types of recommender systems reflects the dis-
tinction in the preceding section between individually sensi-
tive and interpersonal grounds for attributing aims. While 
content-based systems do not even require multiple users, 
collaborative filtering systems are inherently presumptuous 
in the way they depend on inter-user similarity.11
To see exactly how collaborative filtering is presumptu-
ous, we must take a closer look.12 As just noted, recom-
mendations from collaborative filtering systems depend on 
records of the preferences of other users. In a basic col-
laborative filtering system, the data consist of item ratings 
for many combinations of users and items, i.e., ordered tri-
ples of user, item, and rating. The relevant items might be 
anything on which a person might take a recommendation, 
e.g., songs, movies, books, news stories, social media posts, 
groceries, restaurants, travel routes, college courses, occupa-
tions, romantic partners, etc. The task of such a system is to 
predict users’ ratings of items they have not yet rated.
Consider a user and a new item she has not yet rated. 
With collaborative filtering, the first step in predicting this 
user’s rating is to identify the users to whom she is most 
similar.13 Similarity of two users is based primarily on the 
similarity of the ratings they have given to the items they 
have both rated. The basis for similarity may be extended 
beyond just prior ratings to also include demographic fea-
tures or personal details (Pazzani 1999). Once the class of 
similar users has been identified,14 the next step is to deter-
mine how that group of similar users rates the new item, 
and, on that basis, predict the target user’s rating of the item. 
Ekstrand et al. (2011) provides a helpful high-level descrip-
tion of these systems:
The fundamental assumption behind this method is 
that other users’ opinions can be selected and aggre-
gated in such a way as to provide a reasonable predic-
tion of the active user’s preference. Intuitively, they 
assume that, if users agree about the quality or rel-
evance of some items, then they will likely agree about 
other items—if a group of users likes the same things 
as Mary, then Mary is likely to like the things they like 
which she hasn’t yet seen. (Ekstrand et al. 2011, p. 88)
Thus, predictions of a person’s preferences, and, in par-
ticular, any attributions of aims that are generated from a 
collaborative filtering recommender system are guaranteed 
to be presumptuous. They are not directed toward interpreta-
tion of the individual qua individual. Rather, they depend 
essentially on the presupposition that a person will have the 
same aims as those people to whom she is otherwise similar. 
They assume the individual in question will be yet another 
instance of a pattern of features and aims that has emerged 
in the larger population.
Now we are in a position to observe how such systems 
may induce and extend the sort of conformity that they 
already presuppose. The idea is not just that they perpetuate 
existing conformity, but furthermore that they resolve gen-
erality or indeterminacy in a person’s aims in the direction 
of greater conformity. Suppose that a collaborative filtering 
recommender system is the back-end for an artificial virtual 
assistant that attributes aims to a person, and accordingly 
presents her with default courses of action, which she is 
free to reject or ignore, throughout her day.15 The level of 
automation and integration envisioned here is easily fore-
seeable and only slightly beyond what is presently avail-
able. The system might offer intelligent default options for 
11 Content-based recommender systems are not inherently presump-
tuous, since they do not necessarily even require more than a single 
user. However, if a content-based approach were adapted to make use 
of some measure of inter-user similarity, it could potentially generate 
presumptuous aim attributions as well.
12 The following descriptions of collaborative filtering systems draw 
from Adomavicius and Tuzhilin (2005), Schafer et  al. (2007), Mel-
ville and Sindhwani (2010), and Ekstrand et al. (2011), all of whom 
agree on all of the basic details relevant here.
13 This is part of user-user (Ekstrand et  al. 2011)—also known as 
user-based (Schafer et al. 2007) or neighborhood-based (Melville and 
Sindhwani 2010)—collaborative filtering, where item ratings are pre-
dicted on the basis of ratings by similar users. An alternative is item-
item (Ekstrand et al. 2011)—also known as item-based (Schafer et al. 
2007; Melville and Sindhwani 2010)—collaborative filtering, accord-
ing to which earlier ratings are used to group items (rather than users) 
by similarity. With item-item systems, items are grouped according to 
whether they are highly rated by the same group of users. Although 
we will focus on user-user collaborative filtering, it is worth noting 
that both user-user and item-item methods yield presumptuous rec-
ommendations, since both use interpersonal similarity in one area to 
predict interpersonal similarity in another.
14 There need not be a sharply circumscribed group of similar users. 
Instead every user can be taken into account, but with their ratings 
weighted according to how similar they are to the target user.
15 Presenting a user with default courses of action which she is 
free to ignore or reject would count as a nudge (Thaler and Sun-
stein 2008). Hence, the worries such a system raises regarding user 
autonomy are less severe than the worries we might have with a more 
coercive system. This gives us room to focus on the particular moral 
concerns raised by presumptuousness and over-specificity, while 
bracketing further issues about autonomy.
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food, comfort, news, entertainment, and travel—i.e., default 
meals, default ambiance, default articles and stories, default 
music and videos, default routes and destinations. These 
defaults could be offered as suggestions, perhaps via push 
notifications, or the items themselves could be actually pro-
vided by the likes of smart home automation products, driv-
erless cars, etc.
The technological set-up just laid out embodies the two 
key characteristics of aim attributions described in previ-
ous sections. First, any aim attributions generated by such 
a system will be presumptuous, based as they are on the 
assumption that the target user has aims like other users who 
are like her. Second, the aims attributed will usually be over-
specific. That is simply because the real options (like par-
ticular products and services) that are actually available to be 
offered are necessarily particular and concrete, not general 
or abstract. Consider: To enable travel, a navigation system 
or autonomous vehicle cannot simply opt for country roads 
rather than the highway; it must select a particular country 
road. Similarly, music of a particular genre cannot be pro-
vided as a default without also providing particular tracks 
or pieces that exemplify that genre. Thus, a high degree of 
specificity is not a contingent fact about these systems, but 
rather an inherent characteristic of the provision of action-
able recommendations or fully concrete default options.16 
Insofar as the user’s antecedent aims are not so specific, the 
system’s recommendations will be over-specific.
In light of this presumptuousness and over-specificity, a 
mechanism for the inducement of conformity is apparent. 
When the system attributes an over-specific aim to the user 
(by offering her a specific item that satisfies one of her gen-
eral aims), the user will likely acquiesce and is unlikely to 
protest. So this aim attribution, insofar as it is over-specific 
but not simply inaccurate, will prompt no error signal; there 
will be no signal to stop, adjust, or otherwise correct the 
system. And since the item offered satisfies the user’s ante-
cedent general aim, the new present intention to proceed 
with the item is likely to stabilize. Thus, the aim attributions 
are self-fulfilling: The person’s general aims evolve to more 
specific aims according to the specific attributions by the 
system she is using.
Since the system in question attributes aims according to 
collaborative filtering, it attributes aims presumptuously. So, 
since the system is guided by the premise that this user will 
have aims like other users, this user’s aims will sharpen to 
conform with the specific aims of others. Hence, when the 
presumptuous attribution of an aim triggers its own fulfill-
ment, a prediction of conformity becomes a promotion of 
conformity.
I have deliberately constructed the set-up just described 
to allow a clear interface between modern recommender sys-
tems and the foregoing premises about over-specific and pre-
sumptuous attributions of aims. However, mechanisms for 
the inducement of conformity will not always be so straight-
forward. Hence, the technological scenario described above 
is offered as something like a proof of concept. I conjecture 
that in more complicated scenarios, the conformity effects 
will be less direct and less pronounced for the individual 
users involved, but similarly significant in aggregate. If that 
is correct, then inducements to conformity driven by auto-
mated presumptuousness will be subtle, and, for that reason, 
potentially more likely to pass unnoticed.
This section described a straightforward mechanism 
through which collaborative filtering recommender systems 
may contribute to interpersonal conformity in our aims. This 
is one salient case among wider varieties of deindividuali-
zation due to the application of large-scale analytics to per-
sonal data (Vedder 1999), and we should find it concerning. 
Many of us, I expect, are inclined to follow Mill in holding 
that employing our individual faculties to choose our own 
individual paths is a deep, perhaps foundational, source of 
value in our lives (Mill 1859/2003). If so, then we should 
avoid mechanisms that promote conformity and discourage 
their use. However, there is room for disagreement about 
the goodness or badness of conformity, and I have no pre-
tense of settling that issue. For present purposes, it will suf-
fice to note that conformity, and its antithesis, individuality, 
are morally relevant categories. Therefore, the tendency to 
induce conformity should be investigated, considered, and 
weighed, when designing and deploying such systems.
The broader moral significance 
of automated presumptuousness
We have seen that automating particular sorts of inferences 
through recommender systems may induce interpersonal 
conformity. This is due, in part, to the fact that these systems 
operate on the basis of the presumptuous assumption that 
individuals will have aims similar to those of people who 
are otherwise similar. Putting aside the question of whether 
these systems do indeed perpetuate conformity, there is a 
more basic worry about how these systems operate. If pre-
sumptuous aim attributions are intrinsically morally prob-
lematic, even if just moderately so, then acceleration and 
proliferation of such attributions by automated systems is 
morally objectionable, independently of the eventual social 
consequences. In this section, I will suggest that presumptu-
ous aim attribution is indeed inherently morally problematic.
16 Over-specificity can be mitigated by recommending a list of 
options instead of a single one. Although each option would be over-
specific, the full list may better reflect a user’s general aim. Of course, 
whether this is possible depends on whether the use case requires 
automatic selection of a single option (as in the case of autonomous 
navigation).
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We will consider how presumptuousness of an aim attribu-
tion combines with its accuracy or inaccuracy to affect how 
we evaluate it. Recall our four-way distinction regarding accu-
racy: Aim attributions may be accurate, inaccurate because 
over-specific, inaccurate because under-specific, or simply 
inaccurate. To avoid adding complications, we will continue 
to ignore under-specificity. Next, regarding evidence, we had 
a three-way distinction among attributions made without any 
evidence, attributions made presumptuously, and individually 
sensitive attributions. Since they are unusual, we will continue 
to ignore attributions without any evidence. That leaves us 
with a three-way distinction and a cross-cutting two-way dis-
tinction, and so six cases for evaluation, as shown in Table 1.
I have deliberately given each of the six cases a provoca-
tive label. The only one of these labels I can hope to thor-
oughly justify is “inducement of conformity” for box #3, on 
the basis of the argument of the preceding section. The rest 
are intended primarily to be suggestive, to direct our attention 
to broader worries about presumptuous attributions of aims. 
As we examine each column in turn, we will see that our 
evaluations are sensitive not just to the accuracy of the aim 
attributions but also to the evidence on which they are based.
In box #1, we have the application of an interpersonal 
generalization to yield a simply inaccurate conclusion about 
a person. In contrast, in box #2, the simple inaccuracy is due 
to the fact that we sometimes have incorrect information 
about each other. To see the distinction and what difference 
it makes, consider an alternate version of the Celina sce-
narios. Suppose that during her travels Celina faced some 
unexpected challenges but rose to the occasion. Further sup-
pose that, as a result, she quickly developed a self-reliance, 
confidence, and assertiveness that neither she nor others had 
recognized in her before. Celina immediately values these 
traits and embraces them as core elements of her charac-
ter. Then, before returning home, she seeks opportunities to 
exercise these traits, and the parking monitor job would have 
been especially attractive to her. Nevertheless, continue to 
suppose that both Celina’s parents and the program admin-
istrator, oblivious to recent events in Celina’s life, attribute 
to her the aim of selling university merchandise according 
to the rationales described earlier.
In this alternate version of the story, the aim attributed 
by both Celina’s parents and the program administrator is 
simply inaccurate. In this version, as in the original, both 
attributions are made (due to the situation) without actually 
consulting her; hence, the attributions are equally paternal-
istic (if paternalistic at all). Now we can notice that, despite 
these similarities, Celina’s parents’ inference seems sensi-
ble, while the administrator’s inference seems objectionable. 
Both inferences were inductive, reasoning from a pattern in 
seen instances, to a conclusion about a new case. However, 
the administrator’s basis was an interpersonal pattern of aims 
and interests, while Celina’s parents relied on Celina’s own 
individual history of aims and interests. Although Celina’s 
parents lacked the most up-to-date information about what 
sort of individual Celina had become, they still treated her 
as an individual. In contrast, the administrator’s reasoning 
treats Celina primarily as a member of a group, rather than 
as an individual with a particular set of attributes. Thus, his 
inference exemplifies a characteristic that makes some ste-
reotypes objectionable (Blum 2004),17 and constitutes a sort 
of deindividualization (Vedder 1999). Hence box #1 appears 
objectionable in a way that box #2 does not.
We move now to boxes #3 and #4. The discussion of the 
conformity-inducing properties of collaborative filtering 
recommender systems belongs in box #3. We have seen that 
these cases are worrisome because these systems realize a 
mechanism for perpetuating a presupposition of conform-
ity by directing the development of our general, not-yet-
refined aims. In contrast, notice that the aim attributions 
of box #4 are less worrisome. In fact, the box #4 attribu-
tions of over-specific aims may be quite desirable. Due to 
shortcomings of our information, experience, or imagina-
tion, we are not always well-equipped to further specify our 
own aims all by ourselves. The advice of those who know 
us well—those who are sensitive to the traits that make us 
unique individuals—is among our most valuable resources 
as we grow and evolve as persons.18 Recognizing the value 
Table 1  Morally significant categories of aim attribution
Simply inaccurate Over-specific Accurate
Presumptuous attribution (#1)
Mistaken deindividualization
(#3)
Inducement of conformity
(#5)
Statistical fidelity
Individually sensitive attribution (#2)
Misapprehended individuality
(#4)
Cooperative individualism
(#6)
Interpersonal understanding
17 Though it raises some of the same moral concerns as stereotyping, 
presumptuous attribution of mental states is broader than stereotyping 
in one way and narrower in another. It is broader in that the generali-
zations involved need not invoke well-recognized social categories. It 
is narrower in that it applies only to the attribution of mental states, 
not other characteristics (at least not directly).
18 The advice of those who know us well carries dangers of its own. 
Among the risks here is the premature specification of our aims, 
which may short-circuit the trial-and-error process by which we 
might otherwise develop as individual agents and persons.
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of such assistance is to mark a limit to the individualism 
that grounded our complaints about the presumptuous 
attributions of over-specific aims in box #3. A moderate, 
cooperative individualism that objects to sly inducements of 
conformity should not be conflated with a fend-for-yourself 
ethos that rejects the benefits of close relationships formed 
in community with others. Hence, box #4 is largely free of 
the worries aroused by box #3.
Finally, turn to boxes #5 and #6. Accurately attributing to 
a person an aim she actually has, based on a rich knowledge 
of her as an individual, can be wonderful. It is a nourishment 
to and a fruit of the deepest relationships we have. These 
aim attributions, which we find in box #6, manifest a kind 
of interpersonal understanding that is regrettably rare when 
our connections are too superficial.
Compare these to the accurate attributions made pre-
sumptuously in box #5. Here the specificity of the aims 
attributed matches the specificity of the person’s actual aims. 
In the case of product recommendation, the likely reason 
an attribution would be accurate instead of over-specific 
would be that the person actually wanted something very 
specific, and the interpersonal statistical inference yielded a 
recommendation of that very thing. These high-fidelity, pre-
sumptuous attributions may strike us as almost magical, or 
perhaps even creepy, precisely because the attributer did not 
have the right information to make sense of such an accu-
rate attribution. The magic ingredient, of course, would be 
the presupposition of interpersonal similarity that drives the 
statistical inference. This was the element that we regarded 
as objectionable in box #1. We are likely to find box #5 less 
objectionable than box #1, though, because of the value of 
accuracy, as well as the delight we take in the impression 
that we have been understood, even if (as in box #5) the 
understanding was not of us as individuals but primarily 
of the patterns we instantiate. Only in box #6, where the 
attribution is both accurate and non-presumptuous, is there 
genuine interpersonal understanding.
In the preceding section, we worried that automated rec-
ommendation systems may have the effect of diminishing 
individuality across a population. In working through the 
array of cases in Table 1, we have seen how presumptu-
ous attributions of aims efface individuality in a more direct 
way. People and systems that operate presumptuously fail to 
treat persons as individuals. They focus on trends of a larger 
group and consider the individual person only derivatively. 
This is the moral problem of presumptuousness, which we 
should hope not to be accelerated and proliferated through 
automation.
To deal with a person by treating her as a member of a 
group is not to deal with her as an individual person per se. 
Rather, it is to deal with her more like an object among other 
objects. Along these lines, we close with a connection to 
Peter Strawson’s distinction between responding to a person 
with objective attitudes and responding to the person with 
reactive attitudes.
To adopt the objective attitude to another human being 
is to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as 
a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be 
called treatment; as something certainly to be taken 
account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be man-
aged or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to 
be avoided… The objective attitude… cannot include 
the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which 
belong to involvement or participation with others in 
inter-personal human relationships. (Strawson 1974, 
p. 9)
Even if good lives do not require constant active involve-
ment in full-fledged interpersonal relationships, we may nev-
ertheless worry that our lives are impoverished when we are 
too often subject to objective attitudes. As artificial systems 
become increasingly involved in our lives and assume roles 
that other humans have, our relationships built around reac-
tive attitudes may be displaced by relationships dominated 
by the statistical stance and presumptuous aim attributions. 
If so, then we should worry that, in being increasingly 
treated as mere objects, we increasingly come to be mere 
objects.
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